

Historical, Ideological and Political Origins of the Current Geopolitical View of the Ukrainian Elite

Ukrayna Elitinin Mevcut Jeopolitik Görüşünün Tarihsel, İdeolojik ve Siyasi Kökenleri

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Abstract

The article engages with the dilemma of the Ukrainian foreign policy and its civilizational choice. At present, under the deep Ukrainian crisis, the Russian political elite is attempting to stop the reduction of its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. In the near future, the issue of interaction between the Russian and the Ukrainian elites will get into the discursive window based on the ideological legacy of the Ukrainian political thought of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This is related to the future development of Ukraine in the face of the weakening of the Russian imperial center. Upon the methodology of geopolitical approach and discourse analysis, three pillars of the Ukrainian political thought of the period – pro-Russian (Drahomanov, Lypynsky, Hrushevsky), pro-Western (Lypa, Rudnyckyj, Zhuk) and autochthonous (Syniavskiy) are analyzed and seen as an entry point for the beginning of the normalization of the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Key Words: Ukraine, Russia, Ideological Legacy, Foreign Policy Choice, Geopolitics

Öz

Makale, Ukrayna dış politikasının ikilemi ve onun medeniyet tercihi meselesini ele almaktadır. Günümüzde, derin Ukrayna krizi ortamında, Rus siyasi elitleri post-Sovyet alandaki nüfuz sahalarının daralmasını durdurmaya çalışmaktadır. Yakın gelecekte, Rus ve Ukrayna elitleri arasındaki etkileşim meselesi, 19. yüzyıl sonu ile 20. yüzyıl başındaki Ukrayna siyasal düşüncesinin ideolojik mirası temelinde yeniden tartışma alanına girecektir. Bu durum, Rus emperyal merkezinin zayıflaması karşısında Ukrayna'nın gelecekteki gelişimiyle bağlantılıdır. Jeopolitik yaklaşım ve söylem analizi metodolojisi temelinde, dönemin Ukrayna siyasal düşüncesinin üç temel sütunu incelenmektedir: Rusya yanlısı yaklaşım (Drahomanov, Lypynsky, Hrushevsky), Batı yanlısı yaklaşım (Lypa, Rudnyckyj, Zhuk) ve otokton/yerlici yaklaşım (Syniavskiy). Bu yaklaşımlar, Rusya ile Ukrayna arasındaki ikili ilişkilerin normalleşme sürecinin başlangıcı için bir giriş noktası olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ukrayna, Rusya, İdeolojik Miras, Dış Politika Tercihi, Jeopolitik

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The Rise of the New World Order and Crises on the Periphery of the USA

The Ukrainian crisis has been making headlines all around the world. Its genesis aims at using the territory of the former Soviet Republic as military and political steppingstones and a battering ram against the Russian Federation. This is another post-Soviet republic, while the Ukrainian population has been recorded in an anti-Russian state of mind for 35 years. The Russian Federation is drawn into the Ukrainian crisis due to sharing a common border. While the geopolitical space around Russia has been shrinking, the latest trends of the world and regional politics show the rebirth of interest in the Russian political elite to the reassessment of the Cold War results and attempts to stop the reduction of its sphere of influence on the post-Soviet space. The Ukrainian direction becomes the priority for Moscow. Thus, to solve the crisis, it is necessary to comprehend the conceptual sources of the worldview of the modern Ukrainian elite so as to interact with the Ukrainian post-Soviet establishment and society.

The purpose of the research is to determine some conceptual origins of the Ukrainian foreign policy in the context of the weakening of the Russian imperial center in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Thus, the study of the ideological legacy of Ukrainian political thought in the context of its foreign policy choice became possible after 1991. The research methodology is a geopolitical approach and discourse analysis.

Objective Reasons for the Weakness of the Ukrainian Studies in Russia

As the Russian researcher Andrey Teslya underlines, Ukrainian political thought of the 19th–20th centuries rarely attracted attention of researchers in Russia¹. The weakness of academic interest is explained with the institutional structure of academic research in post-Soviet Russia. Until recently, Ukrainian substrate was unrelated to the history of Russia or Slavic studies. It fell into the scope of Ukrainian academic institutions, following the ethno-territorial organization of humanitarian research in the Soviet Union. However, only a limited number of issues, mainly devoted to the Russian-Ukrainian relations and interactions, were outside this traditional framework. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian and Belorussian themes went under the jurisdiction of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The first two decades of the 21st century have marked the rise in scholarly attention. In the article by Vladimir Putin, *On the Historical Unity of Russians*

1 Andrey, Teslya, "Sozdavaya politicheskuyu naciyu: Vyacheslav Lipinskij i ego konservativnaya teoriya 1920-h godov," Sociologicheskoe obozrenie, Volume: 13, Issue: 3, 2014, pp 33–63.

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and Ukrainians², it is underlined, that the main battlefield is a field of ideology. It highlights the hot-button issue of the lost minds of the Ukrainians that resulted into 'the wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine, between the parts of what is essentially the same historical and spiritual space <...> These are, first and foremost, the consequences of our own mistakes made at different periods of time'³. There is a conceptual difference between Ukraine not being Russia and Ukraine being anti-Russia. The first is an option and a recognition of the new geopolitical reality. However, the second is unacceptable. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it took three decades for the Russian elite to officially recognize the essence of the Ukrainian problem. According to Putin, 'Ukraine's ruling circles decided to justify their country's independence through the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They began to mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and refer to the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation'⁴. This has a clear and dramatic consequence because 'the situation in Ukraine today is completely different because it involves a forced change of identity'.

Thus, sources of recoding of Ukraine should be found. One of these is the legacy of Ukrainian political thought at the turn of the 20th century.

Ukrainian Political and Historical Discourse in the Ukrainian, Russian and Foreign Historiography of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Period

Many works devoted to the problems of the emergence of Ukrainian statehood in the late 19th – early 20th centuries were published in Ukraine. However, some of them are ideologized due to the political imperatives. Nevertheless, it is necessary to single out the research by Viktor Burlachuk (*The Nation and the State, The Hetman, the Elite, and the Class of Farmers, The Peasant with Sword and Plow, Territorial Awareness as State Ideology, A Philosopher of Ukrainian Politics*), Borys Andresiuk and Mykola Horelov (*Lypynsky on the Threats to Ukrainian Statehood*)⁵, Mykola Tomenko (*Dissemination of Liberal Ideas in Ukraine, The Priority of Individual Rights, The Priority of Law, Self-Government, The National Idea, Basic Characteristics of the Present-Day Ukrainian Liberalism*)⁶, Oleksandr Saltovsky (*Origins of Ukrainian Political Geography, Russia as a Geopolitical Problem, Plans for the Future, The Eastern Vector*

- 2 Vladimir V., Putin, "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," President of Russia Official Website, July 12, 2021, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>
- 3 Vladimir V., Putin, *ibid.*
- 4 Vladimir V., Putin, *ibid.*
- 5 Victor, Burlachuk, Borys, Andresyuk, Mykola, Horelov, "Classocratic View", *Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis*, Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996, pp. 53-69.
- 6 Mykola, Tomenko, "The Liberal Idea in Ukraine", *Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis*, Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996, pp. 71-81.

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of *Ukraine's Interests*)⁷ are groundbreaking. The results of the research were summarized and represented in the fundamental collective monograph in English and Ukrainian, *Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis* (Ukrainian Statehood 1996). This monograph emerged on the fifth anniversary of Ukrainian independence and is a vivid attempt to find 'coherent political philosophy adequate to current realities'⁸. It brings up the issue of the national state-building thought, free of propagandism and radicalism.

The Ukrainian historian V. Potul'nyts'kyj engages with Ukrainian historical and political works, written between the 1860s and the 1940s (after unsuccessful attempts to create the Ukrainian state in 1917–1920) as a basic source for understanding Ukrainian perception of Russia. He singles out three political trends of the Ukrainian thought – populism, conservatism and nationalism as reflections of antagonistic generation units within one actual generation. His extensive and nuanced review is based upon Mannheim's concept of generations⁹.

In Western historiography, the problem of the ideological legacy of Ukrainian political thought of this period was fundamentally studied by Eugene Pyziur. His work, *V. Lypynsky's Idea of Nation*, published posthumously, reveals some little-known views of the given Ukrainian thinker. For example, one of the Lypynsky's least understood and most misinterpreted ideas of Alliance of the three Rus' (Sojuz tr'ox Rusej) is closely analyzed¹⁰, and this vision of political configuration is highly relevant to our discourse. For two decades, The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, an international forum for scholarship in Ukrainian Studies, has focused on the Ukrainian idea in its Harvard Ukrainian Studies Journal and other monographs. Its special issue of 1985 is fully devoted to the political and social ideas of Vyacheslav Lypynsky. Other research papers highlight the development of M. Hrushevsky's personality and ideas. However, in Western historiography, there is a notable shift to his pro-Western ideas on account of a possible pro-Russian vector of Ukraine. A. Kapeler (Austria) offers some reflections on the significance of the Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives for Russian-Ukrainian relations and analyses the Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives, politics of history and competing memories, as they reflect the struggle over the geopolitical and cultural orien-

7 Oleksandr, Saltovsky, "The Geopolitical Component of Ukrainian Nation-Building Thought (First Half of the Twentieth Century)", *Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis*, Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996, pp. 83-94.

8 Oleksandr, Derhachov, *Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis*, Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996, 430 p.

9 Volodymyr, Potul'nyts'kyj "The Image of Russia and the Russians in Ukrainian Political Thought (1860-1945)," *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Issue: 16, 1998, pp. 1–9.

10 Evgenyi, Pyziur, "V. Lypynsky's Idea of Nation," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Volume: 9, Issue: 3/4, 1985, pp. 302–325.

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tation of Ukraine which is of crucial importance for the future development of the post-Soviet space and of Eastern Europe¹¹.

In Russian historiography, A. Magurchak's *Andriy Zhuk about the Ukrainian Liberation Movement of 1917–1921* stands apart. It examines the political and philosophical heritage of one of the ideologists of the Ukrainian statehood of this period, Andriy Zhuk¹². The problems of the ideological legacy of Ukrainian political thought are strictly connected to political issues of the development of the Ukrainian state. Until 2014, it was a choice between a unitary state system and federalization of Ukrainian space. The division of Ukrainian population into three parts is explained from the point of view of different social identities relevant to historical experiences: Eastern Ukraine (united with Russia in 1654), Central Ukraine (incorporated in Russia as a result of partitions of Poland in 1772–1795) and Western Ukraine (joined to the rest of Ukraine in 1939–1945). Dobrolyubov argues that this generates a binary political polarization of Ukraine, when the eastern part of the population has the same poly-ethnic social identity with the population of Russia¹³. Despite the technologies of political mobilization, a choice remains relevant so that the Ukrainian people get tired of the imposed Russian-Ukrainian conflict and anti-Russian rhetoric. The consistent study by the Crimean scholar Andrey Malgyn's *Ukraine: Sobornost or Regionalism*¹⁴ is crucial.

At present, Russian-Ukrainian relations follow the trajectory of deterioration and are characterized by emotional overload along with a high degree of conflict. Until 2014, there were discussions in Ukraine regarding its foreign policy choices (S. Iurchenko, M. Shepelev, E. Kaminsky, A. Irkhin, B. Kantselyaruk), after the Crimean Spring it became obvious that the pro-Western and anti-Russian vector of development was chosen by Ukraine. However, the problem of foreign policy choice of the Ukrainian elite and other ways of developing Ukrainian statehood will still be relevant to the dynamics of international relations. Despite the crisis of the bilateral relations, the issue of interaction between the Russian and Ukrainian elites will be within a discursive window based on the ideological legacy of Ukrainian political thought. The ideas represented in the legacy of the late 19th – early 20th centuries are the entry points to the return of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations to the

- 11 Andreas, Kappeler, "Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the imperial past and competing memories," *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Volume: 5, Issue: 2, 2014, pp. 107–115, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2014.05.005>
- 12 Andrey, Magurchak, "Andrej Zhuk ob ukrainskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii 1917-1921 gg," *Vestnik MGGU imeni M.A. Sholohova*, 2014, Issue: 1, pp. 33–41.
- 13 Sergey, Dobrolyubov, "The Two-Factor (Authority-Solidarity) Model of Society's Structural Cycles in the Evolutionary Perspective," *Social Evolution & History*, Volume: 20, Issue: 20, 2021, p. 87.
- 14 Andrey, Malgyn, *Ukraina: sobornost' ili regionalism*, Simferopol': SONAT, 2005.

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normalization track which is a kind of a zero point reset position. It was then in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when a distinguished and unique set of Ukrainian political ideas manifested itself for the future development of the country in the face of the weakening Russian imperial center. At the same time, we make an appeal to polemical works with a clear research depth disregarding deliberately the works of such thinkers as Mykola Mikhnovsky and Dmytro Dontsov due to their excessive radicalism.

Ukraine between the West and the East in the late 19th – early 20th Century: Civilizational and Geopolitical Choice

Ukrainian geopolitical ideas for interaction with the West, Europe, and Russia during the period of weakening and collapse of the imperial center is divided into three groups: (1) pro-Russian (expressed in works by Mykhailo Dragomanov, Vyacheslav Lypynsky and Mykhailo Hrushevsky); (2) pro-Western or anti-Russian (by Yurii Lypa, Stepan Rudnyzkyj, Andriy Zhuk); and (3) autochthonous which sees Ukraine as a bridge between North and South, West and East, even within the framework of the Soviet project (by Antin Syniavskiy).

The first group of scholars, although underlining the necessity of a broad autonomy for Ukraine, recognized the futility of a complete break with the Eurasian project (the idea of Alliance of the three Rus' by V. Lypynsky). More importantly, it noted that Ukraine had solved its main geopolitical tasks (access to the Black Sea) in alliance with Russia¹⁵. Another challenge of Ukrainian geopolitics was met with the return of Western Ukrainian territories within the framework of the Soviet project.

According to V. Lypynsky, historian, political philosopher, and publicist, born on 17 April 1882 in Volhynia, the historical mission of Ukraine was to make the synthesis of Western European and Eastern Hellenistic-Byzantine cultures. By implementing this extremely difficult task, the Ukrainian state would initiate a new historical era in the East of Europe and ensure a happier life not only for itself, but also for all the neighboring people. Lypynsky in *Letters to Grain Growers* ("Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv"¹⁶) represented this idea as that of Ukrainian messianism¹⁷. Lypynsky saw a complete estrangement with the Slavic states as futile. E. Pyziur, a researcher of his heritage, notes that Lypynsky was aware of the idea of creating an Alliance of three Rus' in Eastern Europe. However, this idea remained obscure to researchers. That durable alliance of the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians was based on independence of these states and had a political bloc in mind. Pyziur explains Lypynsky's ad-

15 Mykhailo, Dragomanov, *Literaturno-publicistichni praci*, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1970.

16 Vyacheslav, Lypynsky, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, Vienna, 1926.

17 Evgenyi, Pyziur, "V. Lypynsky's Idea of Nation" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Volume: 9, Issue: 3/4, 1985, pp. 302–325.

diction to this alliance because of the potential limitations of Ukraine as an individual nation-state. Others like Dontsov, took this idea as a betrayal because the nature of this alliance was not explained and elaborated by Lypynsky. As E. Pyziur highlights, Lypynsky proceeded from agrarian conservative aristocracy so he believed that the Alliance of the three was necessary. Since individually they wouldn't be able to resist either the nomadic influence of the East (or Islamic fundamentalism) or the penetration of anonymous financial capital, 'he warned his fellow-Ukrainians against becoming either consciously or unconsciously a tool in the hands of the West against the European East, and vice-versa'¹⁸. However, the hostile capital and agricultural colonization from the West was an even more dangerous enemy. According to his political views, Lypynsky was a monarchist and Ukrainian separatist. For V. Potul'nyts'kyj, the scholar is a founder of sovereignty in Ukrainian historiography and conservatism in Ukrainian political studies. Some of his ideas like territorial patriotism, reconciliation of Eastern and Western influences within the Ukrainian nation, and religion and culture have been successfully implemented¹⁹.

The Pro-Russian (Eurasian) Direction of thought was developed at the end of the 19th century by Mykhailo Dragomanov. In his polemical *Letters to the Dnieper Ukraine* ("Lysty na Naddnipyriansku Ukrayinu")²⁰, he notes that all Ukrainian devotion to Moscow is subjectively emotional and coming down not only to the fact that in Ukraine they read Pushkin, Gogol and Turgenev. However, Ukrainian devotion to it lies in the fact that there are no serious grounds for state Ukrainian separatism, Ukraine's only wish being the realization of the idea of Ukrainian autonomy²¹. As Drahomanov emphasizes, Ukraine cannot exist as a cultural region if it doesn't possess the southern shores of the Black Sea. At the end of the 17th century, the Cossacks rebelled decisively against Moscow. However, as soon as Peter the Great began to fight with Turkey in order to break a window to Europe on the Azov and Black Seas, the Cossacks became his faithful servants. Drahomanov writes:

'We had these shores in the times of the Uglichs, Tivertsy and Tmutarakan Rus; we lost part of them under the onslaught of the Turks in the 15th century, but we had to return them one way or another. We failed to do this in the time of Poland, with the Cossacks themselves, so it should have happened in the time of the Muscovite tsars. Poland was, in fact, the state of the Baltic basin, indifferent to the Black Sea affairs, which were of interest to the inhabitants of the Dnieper region. Muscovy, as the state of the Baltic and Caspian basins, was also indifferent to this matter, but the Don region connected it with the Black Sea. This is the

18 Evgenyi, Pyziur, "V. Lypyns'kyj's Idea of Nation", p. 325.

19 Volodymyr, Potul'nyts'kyj, "Politichna doktrina V.Lipins'kogo," *Ukrain's'kij istorichnij zhurnal*, Issue: 9, 1992, pp. 37–45.

20 Mykhailo, Drahomanov, *Lysty na Naddnipyriansku Ukrainu*, Naklad i druk partiinoi drukarni, B.m., 1915, 116 p.

21 Mykhailo, Drahomanov, *Literaturno-publicistichni praci*, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1970, p. 82.

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*fatal reason that the all-European, and not specifically Ukrainian, task of defeating Turkey in the 15th – 16th centuries were carried out in the 17th – 19th centuries by the Muscovite state, and not Polish*²².

Drahomanov explained the military-political orientation of the Zaporozhian Kozakdom towards the Russian state with the historical fact that it was the Muscovite kingdom that had met the geographical and national challenge of Ukraine²³. However, he idealizes Russia. According to him: ‘the Moscow kingdom did us a lot of trouble, but one should understand that it did the same to its other subjects, but still the kingdom was a certain organization of civil forces, to which our Ukraine joined, which nevertheless fulfilled our national tasks: liberation from the Turkish-Tatar and Polish oppression and allegiance’²⁴. Drahomanov notes that it was the policy of Poland in the 16th and 17th centuries that pushed Ukraine into the arms of Moscow. An alliance with the Tatars and Turks was unnatural for Ukrainians. The Turks qualified Ukraine and Muscovy as white Africa or as a source of slaves and janissaries. In 1952, I. Rudnytsky in *Drahomanov as a Political Theorist* highlights a noticeable discrepancy between his Ukrainian and his Russian writings: “In the former he appears as a ruthless critic of the weaknesses of the Ukrainian movement. In order to know Drahomanov, the courageous apologist for the rights of the Ukrainian people against Russian centralism and chauvinism, one must read his writings in Russian. It is only by taking both together that one obtains a well-rounded picture of Drahomanov’s position in the question of Russian-Ukrainian relations”²⁵. An approach like this helps to avoid idealization of Drahomanov’s ideas on the subject of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

While understanding the balance between Russia and the West, Michael Hrushevsky’s work becomes crucial. Stephen Horak argues, ‘Michael Hrushevsky’s life and role he played in Ukrainian affairs were determined by the date of his birth (1866) and by events that occurred during his career’²⁶. Influenced by some ideas of M. Drahomanov and V. Antonovych, the latter being his professor at Kyiv University, Hrushevsky balanced the pro-Russian and pro-Western trends²⁷. The Revolution made him a staunch supporter of Ukrainian statehood along with being a socialist that made him to polemize with conservative, V. Lypynsky. Hrushevsky pays considerable attention to

22 Mykhailo, Drahomanov, *Literaturno-publicistichni praci*, p. 444.

23 Mykhailo, Drahomanov, *ibid*.

24 Mykhailo, Drahomanov, *Literaturno-publicistichni praci*, p. 443.

25 Ivan, Rudnytsky, “Essays in Modern Ukrainian History. Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings,” *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, Volume: 1, Issue: 3, 1952, pp. 70–130.

26 Stephen, Horak, “Michael Hrushevsky: Portrait of an Historian,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Volume: 10, Issue: 3, 1968, p. 341.

27 Sergey, Plokyh, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008, pp. 93-94.

geopolitical issues. Prior to the proclamation of the Fourth Universal²⁸, Hrushevsky was inclined to pro-Moscow (Eastern) orientation in Ukrainian politics. He preferred Ukraine to have broad autonomy within the Russian Democratic Republic rather than to become independent because it would be difficult for Ukraine to maintain its independence. M. Hrushevsky believed that the Great Russian revolution would have a great impact on the political restructuring of the whole Europe and on its transformation into a European federation. Thus, he argued that Ukraine joining democratic Russia became one of the strongest republics of the European federation. However, after the Revolution, M. Hrushevsky turned his attention to the West, realizing that the post-revolutionary Russia was not the kind of Russia Ukrainians wanted. According to him, the Ukrainian orientation to the West can be explained with the historical past of Ukraine and European countries as well as the spiritual and cultural closeness of Ukrainians with other European nations. He notes that Ukraine's Western orientation took full advantage since the 17th century, when Russia severed and destroyed Ukraine's cultural and economic ties with the West after destroying Ukrainian autonomy. In the 19th century, Ukraine remained cut off from the West and turned to the North and to Moscow. This was the chance for Ukraine to improve its cultural environment. Analyzing the geopolitical situation in Ukraine, M. Hrushevsky noted that if the historical and cultural conditions oriented Ukraine to the West, the geography oriented it to the South and the Black Sea, that is also a communication center for Ukraine. However, according to Hrushevsky, Ukraine should abandon the old ways (Moscow to which Ukraine was forcibly 'dragged' by Moscow's rulers; and the 'trampled traces of the bourgeois states of the West') as it needs its own way to development. The scientist came up with the idea of the World Federation of Countries, the first step towards which was the unification of lands connected geographically, economically and culturally. It is the Black Sea that united regions with different geographical and economic conditions that complemented each other. Such unification could become an integrating factor for the World Federation, in which Ukraine would occupy one of the defining positions²⁹.

Hrushevsky's ideas may seem controversial, he often changed his slogans and ideas. However, he was guided by the ideal of affirming the national rights of the Ukrainian people. The credo 'for the people and against foreign rule' often made Hrushevsky choose isolation for Ukraine and a more left-wing political orientation taking into account the need for temporary compromises with stronger counterparties like Austria, Russia or the Soviets³⁰.

28 Mykhailo, Hrushevsky, *Na porozı novoi Ukraïni: gadki i mrii*, Kyiv, 1918.

29 Mykhailo, Hrushevsky, *ibid*.

30 Aleksandr, Dmitriev, "Tri leta Mihaila Grushevskogo: naciya kak vybor," *Gefter*, March 12, 2014, <http://gefeter.ru/archive/11630>

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The Western-centric Ukrainian geopolitical thought was developed by a number of Ukrainian thinkers. The common idea for them is recognition that Ukraine's accession to the Muscovite kingdom was a mistake which resulted into the rupture of its traditional ties with Western Europe, a violent change in foreign trade priorities and geopolitical orientations; the purposeful centralization of social and cultural life (the tsarist government banned studying abroad without a special exit permit), and limiting Ukrainian trade only to the southern ports of the Empire, etc. As Lypynsky writes, in order to destroy Ukrainian trade as a whole, Russian trade and customs policy did everything to break and destroy the trade ties of Ukraine with its historically formed Western markets. It gave it into the hands of the Moscow merchants, to economically tie Ukraine to the north, to the Great Russian centers: Petersburg and Moscow³¹.

Dwelling on the peculiarities of the geopolitical orientations of the Ukrainians and Russians, Stepan Rudnyckyj notes that the Muscovite region had completely different hydrographic routes than Ukraine. Yu. Lypa underlines that while the Ukrainian nation was formed on the riverbanks of the Southern Black Sea, Russia as a nation took shape in the Volga basin. In his book, *The Severance of Russia* (Rozpodil Rosii), Yury Lypa states that though, over the long centuries of expansion, the Russians settled in a significant area, many of the settled territories never truly became Russian. It does not only include those regions where Russians do not have an ethnic majority (Ukraine, the Baltic states, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.), but also Siberia and the Far East. The later years of Russian history were filled with hard struggles because the central government was confronted with regions with non-homogenous populations. The centralist idea turned out to be inexpedient in the expanses of Russia. With passing years, this idea inflicts direct damage to human life. These strikes have already taken and are taking millions of lives both of the people conquered by the Empire and the ethnic Russians supporting the Russian imperial idea³². Yury Lypa argues that under a democratic political system and free development of production and economic ties, various territories begin to separate from Russia. The first among them was Siberia, which is 'essentially Russian America, lying near Russia and connected by rail with it and Central Asia'³³.

Similarly, S. Rudnyckyj, put forward a project to create a Balto-Pontic Federation, that would comprise Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine³⁴. These ideas echo the pan-European approach to deterring Rus-

31 Vyacheslav, Lypynsky, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, Vienna, 1926, p. 65.

32 Yury, Lypa, *Rozpodil Rosii*. L'viv: In-t narodoznavstva NAN Ukraïni, 1995, p. 12.

33 Yury, Lypa, *Rozpodil Rosii*, p. 12.

34 Stepan, Rudnytsky, *Ukraïns'ka sprava zi stanovishcha politichnoï geografii*, Berlin, 1923, p. 138.

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sia. For Rudnyzkyj, the global political role of Ukraine is that its geopolitical space should stop the expansion of Russia to the Adriatic and Aegean seas, to Asia Minor and Egypt, and should make expansion to India impossible³⁵. Interestingly, a vision like this, is set in the logic of the British geostrategic problems of the 19th – 20th centuries³⁶.

A special place in the future Black Sea cooperation zone belongs to Crimea. Crimea is the key to the sea communications of the Black Sea. The owner of Crimea will be able to control Ukraine's access to the sea and its further access to the oceans. Regarding the Ukrainian Crimean policy under the Ukrainian People's Republic, Rudnyzkyj notes that 'the loss of Crimea, where even when (1917) there was a majority of the Ukrainian population, immediately pronounced a death sentence on Ukrainian statehood. Without Crimea there is no independent Ukraine: it breaks its main foundation and support – the Black Sea coast'³⁷. In the view of the scholar, the strategic partners of Ukraine shouldn't be limited to the countries of the Black Sea region and Western Europe. In his opinion, there are a number of states that are natural allies to Ukraine, creating a possibility of a Baltic-Pontic Federation consisting of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine³⁸.

Andriy Zhuk, one of the establishers of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, in his article *What State Relations Should Ukraine Develop?* discusses the types of state relations desirable for Ukraine. According to the author, due to its territorial size, population, and natural resources, Ukraine is strong enough to live a closed life with protected borders. However, while developing its statehood, Ukraine will need connections for the possibility of exchange for its population and its resources. However, it will fail to achieve this in relation to Poland or Lithuania. Both these states are and should be drawn to the North Sea, where Ukraine has no interest and may find itself in a state of conflict with many countries of this region. Therefore, Ukraine must turn its attention to the East, where a federation of new state formations is being forged. It should include the Don and Kuban regions with adjacent regions: Tersk, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Ural and Stavropol. Three districts of the Don region – Taganrog, Rostov and Novocherkassk are predominantly populated by Ukrainians. A narrow belt near the mouth of the Don connects the Ukrainian population with the Western Caucasus, inhabited mostly by Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks, mainly on the shores of the Black Sea, in the Stavropol and partly Terek provinces. Ukraine must enter into close contact with these state as-

35 Stepan, Rudnytsky, *Chomu mi hochemo samostijnoi Ukraïni?* L'viv: Svit, 1994, p. 294.

36 Halford, Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal*, Volume: 23, Issue: 4, 1904, pp 421–437.

37 Stepan, Rudnytsky, *Chomu mi hochemo samostijnoi Ukraïni?*, p. 295.

38 Stepan, Rudnytsky, *Ukraïns'ka sprava zi stanovishcha politichnoi geografii*, pp. 138-139.

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sociations in order to reach the Caspian Sea and Central Asia through them, mainly in the regions of Ural, Akmola, Turgai, Semipalatinsk, Tomsk, Yenisei, Transcaspian and Turkestan, where several million migrants from Ukraine live. Such a connection, in which Ukraine is the main link, will be extremely useful for Ukrainian statehood. It would cut off Moscow from the Caucasus and make it possible to develop the Caucasian ports and establish close contacts with the Black Sea states³⁹.

The third pillar of Ukrainian geopolitical thought was revealed by economist and geographer Antin Syniavskiy, who saw Ukraine as a bridge or link. Syniavskiy states that during the period of riverine and Mediterranean cultures, the territory of Ukraine was a crossroad between East and West. However, after the formation of the Baghdad caliphate in southwest Asia and Cordoba in the far west of Europe in Spain, it became the beaten path for the people passing between the Urals and the Caspian to the West⁴⁰. On Ukraine's geopolitical position within the Soviet Union, Syniavskiy writes that Ukraine is a bridge between the eastern part of our Union, Asia and Western Europe. Ukraine is the way of penetration to the West, into the hostile environment of Western Europe⁴¹.

In Syniavskiy's geopolitical research, socioeconomic issues are central. Speaking about the geopolitical role of Ukraine, he presents an analysis of the importance of such a path through the territory of Ukraine as a transit route to the Mediterranean, India, and the Far East. In his research on the Ukrainian economy, A. Syniavskiy pays special attention to the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean countries. According to him, 'The territory of Ukraine, going from north to south, is a bridge to the Middle East, connected by the cheapest waterways: river and sea'⁴². He justifies the expediency of Ukraine's cooperation with the Middle East because this region is a market for Ukrainian goods. He believes that different levels of economic development and certain differentiation of economies of the Middle East and Ukraine are the basis for the development of economic relations. It would be appropriate to create a certain economic union of Ukraine with the Middle East⁴³. The development of economic relations with this region rather than with western European countries is more profitable for Ukraine. Western European countries with high levels of economic development only need Ukrainian raw materials and not finished products.

39 Andriy, Zhuk, "Do spravi konfliktu mizh Ukraïnoyu i bil'shovic'kim pravitel'stvom", Visnik politiki, literaturi i zhittya, Issue: 186, 1918, pp 32.

40 Antin, Syniavsky, *Vibrani praci*, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993, p. 192.

41 Antin, Syniavsky, *Vibrani praci*, p. 194.

42 Antin, Syniavsky, *Vibrani praci*, p. 195.

43 Antin, Syniavsky, *Vibrani praci*, p. 196.

Lev Gumilyov on the Ukrainian Civilizational Choice

Lev Gumilyov chooses the East as a point of view on Russian history. Thus, he ends the West-oriented perception of Russian political history. He dwells upon the civilizational and political choice of Ukraine as this is a constant problem due to the frontier character of the Ukrainian geopolitical space.

L. Gumilyov proves consistently that internecine wars and strife within Eurasia caused more harm to states than external invasions. At the same time, the divided Russian lands competed with each other for the implementation of the Western and Eastern projects. Thus, the old Russian mood split along with the ethos. The division took place on the basis of complementarity. This meant that every Russian could choose the culture that suited best, whether it be Western Catholic or Eastern or Orthodox, Nestorian and Monophysist in Central Asia, which merged with Nestorian in 1142. Nonetheless, the leading role belonged to attitudes and not dogmas⁴⁴.

In the process of competition of Western (Latin) and Eastern (Mongolian) forces, different value orientations and, consequently, different geopolitical orientations appeared in the Old Russian super ethnos. Daniil Galitsky chose the multi-vector path with greater reliance on the West. The Mongols forced him to demolish the walls of the fortresses. Soon all the lands of the principality were torn apart by their western neighbors. Alexander Nevsky is another example of a strategic choice of relying on Mongolian forces against the expansion of the West. The Novgorod prince retained the Orthodox faith, the Russian ethnic group and statehood along with giving rise to a new passionate impetus that led to the formation of modern Russia⁴⁵. The author's assessment of the policy of Daniil Galitsky is succinctly expressed below:

Then Daniil Galitsky accepted the royal crown of Little Russia from the hands of Pope Innocent IV. For this, he had to fight against the Mongols and carefully promote the union with papism. From a citadel of Orthodoxy, Galicia turned into a small European kingdom, into a vassal of the throne of St. Peter. In other words, Little Russia was forced to fight not for its own, but for the interests of others. This ended in the defeat of 1259, when the Mongol noyon Burundai forced Daniel to tear down the fortresses and give his army for a campaign against Poland. The alliance with the West brought Galicia and its people to disaster. After 80 years, that is, in 1339, the Polish king Casimir the Great annexed Galicia to Poland without a single shot⁴⁶.

These factors made it possible for Nevsky, ruler of Novgorod, to save the future of Russia. It was his orientation to the Mongols and his excellent use and control of political realities that helped.

44 Lev, Gumilyov, Chernaya legenda. Druz'ya i nedrugi Velikoj stepi, Moscow: Ajris-press, 2008, p. 156.

45 Lev, Gumilyov, Chernaya legenda. Druz'ya i nedrugi Velikoj stepi, p. 170.

46 Lev, Gumilyov, Chernaya legenda. Druz'ya i nedrugi Velikoj stepi, p. 162.

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Gumilyov explored and consistently revealed the reasons for the creation of the modern Russian super ethnos. The problem of the reunification of Ukraine and Russia is one of the main issues in its formation. The main reason for the reunion is the religious-confessional community, the oppression of the orthodox subjects of the Polish king by Catholics, and the super-ethnic belonging of Russia and Ukraine. This universal feeling of unity was like a rock and a rational plan of the strong-willed and smart seekers of power. Two closely related ethnic groups, Russian and Ukrainian, united in spite of the political situation, breaking those initiatives that did not correspond to the logic of ethnogenesis⁴⁷.

Conclusion

The above classification allows us to understand the three pillars of Ukrainian political thought regarding Ukraine's foreign policy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These are: pro-Russian, pro-Western and autochthonous.

The pro-Russian pillar of Ukrainian ideological legacy is characterized by a number of conventions. In writings by Dragomanov, Lypynsky, and Hrushevsky, the need for further cooperation and any form of integration with Moscow is recognized along with describing the significant damage caused by the policy of tsarism towards Ukraine. Each author was a supporter of a different political view. Drahomanov was a socialist, Lypynsky was a monarchist and separatist, and Hrushevsky was a federalist. Nonetheless, a window of opportunity for the joint future of Ukraine and Russia unites them.

The discourse of the pro-Western trend of Ukrainian political thought demonstrates its bright anti-Russian rhetoric. There exist two scenarios for the future of Ukraine within this framework: (1) opposing Russia in the process of its deterring, which repeats the geopolitical tasks of the West both a century ago and in today's rapidly changing world; or (2) attempting to build a sanitary belt of the imperial Russian outskirts. At the same time, Lypynsky emphasized the importance of Siberia as Russian America, which should become free, while Rudnyckyj noted the importance of Crimea for Ukraine, deriving a geopolitical formula of no Ukraine without Crimea.

The third pillar is designated as autochthonous. It promotes the preservation of the special geopolitical significance of Ukrainian space, even as a part of Russia (USSR).

The first and the third pillars of Ukrainian philosophical and political thought suggest a broad framework for coexistence in discourse. It covers the Alliance of the three Rus', the joint solution of strategic and national problems, the preservation of a special position and significance within a com-

47 Lev, Gumilyov, *Ot Rusi k Rossii: ocherki etnicheskoj istorii*, Moscow: Ajris-press, 2008, p. 249.

mon integration space. The anti-Russian direction in this political discourse emerges within the framework of: (1) Ukraine as a part of a rim from the Baltic to the Caspian region, which reflects the tasks of the British geostrategy of that period (Mackinder's *The Geographical Pivot of History*), designed to prevent a close union of Germany and Russia, and (2) Ukraine as a bridge for the establishment of new state formations, striving for territorial growth and new alliances at the expense of the former imperial metropolis in the event of the disintegration of Russia.

The analysis of the Ukrainian political discourse at the turn of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century according to the chosen classification of its three directions leaves a certain sense of uncertainty amongst the ideologues of the pro-Russian vector of Ukraine's development. There are constant conventions and limitations, variability and inconsistency. In its analysis a lot depends on the interpretation of the discourse. At the same time, the anti-Russian direction has a rigid ideological framework where there is no room for alternative interpretations. Modern research on the foreign policy course of the Ukrainian state repeats the trajectory of their predecessors. While there are different scenarios for the current Ukrainian crisis, any is likely to result in fragmentation of the Ukrainian geopolitical space. In retrospective, this period is similar to the time of the Ruin as it is shown by Ukrainian historiography of 1657 – 1687. While Russia relaunched its active policy in Ukraine through the conflict, the challenge of understanding this space to reintegrate it successfully is emerging, taking into account the 35 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Let the article be the first step to it.

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