Abstract
This study examines the transformation of the U.S. extended deterrence system in the Asia-Pacific, known as the “hub and spoke” model, in response to China’s rise, through the lens of rational deterrence theory. The existing literature on rational deterrence primarily models extended deterrence as a bilateral relationship between the guarantor state and the potential challenger, treating allies as secondary actors. This article argues that extended deterrence cannot be reduced solely to the guarantor’s capacity; rather, the threat perceptions, strategic choices, and assurance expectations of the “spoke” states constitute core variables shaping the functioning and evolution of the alliance. Employing a historical-comparative analytical approach, the study examines the cases of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. The analysis highlights the relationship between perceived threat and strategic response and explains how U.S. reassurance practices are institutionally reproduced. Findings indicate that Japan and the Philippines, perceiving high levels of threat from China, have adopted hard-balancing strategies; South Korea, with intermediate threat perception, pursues an ambivalent approach between soft balancing and hedging; and Australia, responding to rising threat perceptions, has shifted from hedging to hard balancing.The study concludes that the effectiveness of extended deterrence depends not only on the guarantor’s assurance capacity but also on allies’ threat perceptions and their confidence in receiving repeated reassurance.
Keywords: yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık, rasyonel caydırıcılık teorisi, hub and spoke, ABD, Çin, Asya-Pasifik
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